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THE VIABILITY OF INTERSTATE 
COLLABORATION IN THE ABSENCE OF 
FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION 
H. JOSEPH DRAPALSKI III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Federal Government has declined to enact a 
nationwide regulatory scheme to abate greenhouse gas emissions: 
Congress has repeatedly failed to pass comprehensive legislation and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has only recently—and 
reluctantly—begun to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. In the 
absence of the guidance that might otherwise be afforded by a 
centralized regulatory scheme, some states are now taking action to 
collaborate on abatement efforts through regionally defined 
interstate initiatives. While much scholarship analyzes these state-led 
initiatives with the expectation that federal legislation will soon exist, 
this analysis departs from that tradition. As it is increasingly unlikely 
that federal action will occur in the foreseeable future, it is now 
necessary to consider the long-term viability of these state-led 
initiatives in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation. This 
Note focuses upon two of the most pressing challenges which face the 
regional initiatives: first, the inherently limited breadth of their 
jurisdiction; second, the likelihood of survival in the face of potential 
constitutional challenges. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I will first set the stage 
for this analysis by showing that congressional legislation is not likely 
to occur in the near future. Second, Part I will briefly describe the 
regional initiatives as they stand today. The difficulties the regional 
initiatives face in the absence of federal action will be considered in 
Parts II and III. Part II explores the viability of the initiatives in light 
of their limited jurisdiction. Part III, under the assumption that 
Congress it not likely to pass comprehensive climate change 
legislation in the near future, considers the constitutional concerns 
that may threaten the regional initiatives. 
 
  * Duke University School of Law, J.D. & LL.M. expected 2012; Amherst College, B.A., 
magna cum laude, 2008. 
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II. FEDERAL INACTION AND THE ADVENT OF REGIONAL 
INITIATIVES 
The United States Congress came deceptively close to taking 
affirmative action to abate nationwide greenhouse gas emissions in 
2009, but ultimately failed to pass the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACES) into law.1 Early signs were optimistic, however, 
as ACES did pass through the House of Representatives, but the bill 
fell flat when it failed to come to a vote in the Senate. Since the bill’s 
failure, the political atmosphere surrounding federal climate change 
action has become increasingly toxic. Due to the lack of action at the 
federal level—and the improbability of such action occurring in the 
near future—some states are now coordinating their own interstate 
regulatory policies. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
for example, is the most well-known and longest operating regional 
initiative; a similar initiative has been developed on the West Coast. 
Before delving into an analysis of the viability of such regional 
initiatives, it first is necessary to discuss the circumstances that 
catalyzed the creation of such interstate collaboration and the manner 
in which they function. 
A. The Fruitless Search for a Solution 
With so much empirical and academic support in favor of a 
federal cap-and-trade program,2 it must have seemed hardly a 
 
 1.  The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). The Bill 
passed a vote by the Energy and Commerce Committee by a vote of 33 to 25 on May 21, 2009, 
then also passed out of the House of Representatives, where it was introduced, by a vote of 219 
to 212 on June 26, 2009. 
 2.  JANET PEACE & ROBERT N. STAVINS, PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, IN 
BRIEF: MEANINGFUL AND COST EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY: THE CASE FOR CAP AND 
TRADE 2 (2010) (defining the cap as an upper-limit on emissions determined by the regulatory 
body overseeing the cap-and-trade regime, which then distributes a number of allowances equal 
to this cap) [hereinafter MEANINGFUL AND COST EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY]. One of the 
most successful experiences of the United States with a cap-and-trade program was with its Acid 
Rain Program (ARP). The cap-and-trade portion of the ARP, which was enacted in 1995, has 
accomplished a more than 40% reduction in the United States’ national sulfur dioxide 
emissions. Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the Design, 
Operation, and Assessment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 47 (2007) 
(estimating that benefits from the ARP emission reductions are approximately $142 billion by 
2010, with an annual compliance cost of $3.5 billion); see generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak 
D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC 
LAW 363, 384, 386 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (finding that a cap-
and-trade system is appealing because of its ability to minimize cost, allow for flexibility, 
adaptability, and burden distribution); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the 
Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515, 519–21 (2009) (comparing the relative merits of a tax 
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surprise for those attuned to the political winds in Washington when 
ACES passed through the United States House of Representatives on 
June 26, 2009. However, the bill’s passage was not assured: It passed 
by a margin of only seven votes, 219 to 212, with forty-three 
democrats voting against the bill.3 Although numerous cap-and-trade 
bills were introduced prior to ACES, this vote marked the first time 
that either house of Congress passed a bill which comprehensively 
addressed many climate change inducing greenhouse gases. In 
addition to implementing a nationwide cap-and-trade system, ACES 
contained the sweeping provisions needed to make the U.S. 
internationally competitive by encouraging the development and use 
of renewable technologies while simultaneously decreasing domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions.4 
Despite the overwhelming support it received from industry5 and 
environmental organizations,6 and the tacit approval of politicians 
 
or cap-and-trade solution, finding that while a tax removes uncertainty about price, it does not 
definitively limit the amount of emissions, as opposed to a cap-and-trade system which leaves 
some uncertainty about price, but does explicitly cap emissions). 
 3.  Support for this bill was far from unanimous among Democrats in the House of 
Representatives. In this era of partisan politics, Republican votes against the bill were to be 
expected, but it did not bode well for the bill’s future that such a large contingent of Democratic 
lawmakers also voted against it. H.R.2454 - American Clean Energy And Security Act of 2009, 
OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited Aug. 
31, 2011) (reporting that only eight Republicans voted for the bill, while 169 voted against it, 
and that 211 Democrats voted for the bill, while 43 voted against it). 
 4.  While outside the purview of this paper, the potential panacea this bill promised for 
the Nation’s climate concerns cannot be understood without brief mention of its energy designs. 
The Committee on Energy and Commerce listed the following as the bill’s key provisions: a 
requirement that electric utilities and the government must meet 20% of their electricity 
demand through renewable energy by 2020; a multibillion dollar promise of investment in clean 
energy technology and efficiency; new energy-saving standards for buildings and appliances; a 
reduction in carbon emissions by 80% by 2050 over 2005 levels; and, despite these lofty, but 
achievable goals, a guarantee that costs to the average household will not exceed 50 cents per 
day. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND 
SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454) (2009), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/ 
Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf. 
 5.  Due to the dedicated and extensive negotiations of Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and 
Graham, support for the bill was secured from a broad base of industry parties including 
Exelon, General Electric, Dow Chemical Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and 
Dupont. Hearing on The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 Before the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of David G. Hawkins, Dir. Climate Programs, Nat’l Res. Def. 
Council), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/aces/files/glo_09042301.pdf (stating 
that ACES is aligned with the interests of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, of which these 
companies are members); and closely fits its proposed ideal legislation); John M. Broder, House 
Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/27climate.html?_r=1&hp; Ryan Lizza, As the 
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hailing from both sides of the aisle,7 the bill ultimately tumbled from 
its pinnacle of assured success to the worn carpet of a smoke-filled 
backroom. While a precise reason for the bill’s failure to reach a vote 
in the Senate is subject to discussion, it is clear that internal politics 
significantly contributed to its demise, as the bill became so 
politicized that even the White House, under an administration which 
repeatedly espoused its support for such an initiative,8 would not fight 
for the bill’s passage.9 
Bearing in mind the failure of a bill which appeared so favorably 
positioned to pass both chambers of the Congress, and the particular 
circumstances which doomed it, the prospects for implementing a 
federally mandated cap-and-trade regime in the near future to 
combat climate change are dim.10 The failure of the federal 
government to take action has left open a largely uncharted 
 
World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/ 
101011fa_fact_lizza (noting that support could be found from the oil companies and the 
Chamber of Commerce); Tony Kreindler, New Momentum to Pass a Carbon Cap in 2009, 
CLIMATE 411 (May 21, 2009), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2009/05/21/new-momentum-to-
pass-a-carbon-cap-in-2009/ (noting that the U.S. Climate Action Partnership). 
 6.  The majority of environmental groups supported a bill such as the ACES, something 
for which they had fought for years, with some demanding even stauncher standards. Among 
those who supported the bill were the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Audubon Society, The Nature Conservancy, Alliance for Climate 
Protection, League of Conservation Voters, and Defenders of Wildlife. See supra note 5. 
 7.  While Democratic support seemed predominately a given, the Republicans were far 
from enthusiastic, and thus any support from their party was a huge boon for the bill. Kerry, 
Lieberman, and Graham counted on support from a handful of Republicans: Susan Collins, 
Olympia Snowe, Scott Brown, George LeMieux, and, of course, Lindsey Graham. Id. Although 
even this small Republican support was promising, if the vote on the bill from the House was 
any indicator, the Senators would need more votes than that to compensate for the number of 
Democrats who might oppose it. 
 8.  President Obama’s enthusiastic support for climate change legislation was a principal 
pillar of his campaign in 2008. See Press Release, President Barak Obama, President-Elect 
Obama Promises “New Chapter” on Climate Change (Nov. 18, 2008), available at 
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_obama_promises_new_chapter_on_climate_
change/. 
 9.  The White House did not follow through on its earlier promises to push climate change 
legislation through Congress, however, as it withheld its support from the Bill’s sponsors and 
issued a damaging statement directly to Fox News labeling the bill a “gas tax.” Major Garrett, 
WH Opposes Higher Gas Taxes Floated by S.C. GOP Sen. Graham in Emerging Senate Energy 
Bill, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/04/15/wh-opposes-
higher-gas-taxes-floated-sc-gop-sen-graham-emerging-senate-energy-bill. 
 10.  The White House now entirely avoids the issue of cap-and-trade as a pariah and the 
Republican Party regularly uses the so called “cap-and-tax” as a symbol to disparage any 
climate action effort. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy 
of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/science/ 
earth/26climate.html. 
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regulatory space for state collaborations to take the lead in the fight 
to abate greenhouse gas emissions. Due to their limited impact, 
regional responses are not the optimal solution, and the threats to 
their successful implementation are many. However, in light of the 
present circumstances, an analysis of the continued viability of 
subnational action is warranted. 
B. Regional Initiatives: Coordinated State Action to Abate Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
One alternative to federal action lies in the concerted effort of a 
number of states to take coordinated action.11 Interest in the potential 
of such regional initiatives to fill this unoccupied regulatory space is 
growing, but these efforts face many debilitating problems that will 
take considerable effort to overcome. 
 1. A Subnational Response to Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 
Given the threatening political waters of Congress and resulting 
inactivity, regional initiatives have become an attractive option for 
states. While such an approach may seem to be a novel reaction to the 
failure of ACES, the first such program, the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI), began operation over five years ago. Two 
other regional initiatives are currently in varying stages of 
development: the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), slated to become 
operational on the West Coast in 2012, and the Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (the Midwestern Accord). 
It is argued that the driving force behind a regional approach, as 
opposed to a single state taking action on its own, is cost 
effectiveness.12 Regional actions may be lucrative as they allow states 
to pool their resources and realize a much more significant abatement 
of emissions than any one state could hope to accomplish on its own. 
While the promise of such rewards is alluring, it is by no means 
guaranteed; in fact, some scholars might take the opposite position.13 
 
 11.  Any discussion of regional initiatives in this paper refers solely to their provisions 
regarding the implementation and administration of a cap-and-trade program. Although the 
initiatives also enact various other standards or mechanisms, they are outside the purview of this 
discussion. 
 12.  See infra Part III.A. 
 13.  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1965–66 (2007) [hereinafter Think Globally] (arguing that 
subnational action is both inherently inadequate to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and 
inefficient because of economic considerations (e.g., leakage and free-riding)). The problems 
which face a subnational response are many, and these difficulties are addressed and considered 
at length in Part III, infra. 
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2. The Regional Initiatives. RGGI is comprised of ten Mid-
Atlantic and New England States,14 all of which agreed to the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)15 by the year 2007. Functionally, RGGI is a market-based 
emissions trading program that distributes allowances and 
administers the trade in carbon dioxide emissions allowances from 
fossil fuel-fired power plants of twenty-five megawatts (MW) capacity 
or greater.16 RGGI establishes a regional cap on carbon dioxide 
emissions17 and requires regulated power plants—209 region-wide—to 
possess an allowance for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted.18 A 
critical note about RGGI is that it does not bind any state to follow its 
model rule. RGGI publishes a model rule, and the decision of the 
member states to adopt a similar rule occurs through their respective 
state legislatures. 
As its name suggests, the Western Climate Initiative is a West 
Coast-based regional initiative, but it has an increasingly international 
purview. The Initiative’s membership presently consists of seven 
states and four Canadian provinces.19 The international ambitions of 
 
 14.  The ten states which participate in RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. REG’L 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Maryland which joined in 2007, were the only states not to join earlier with the drafting of the 
Model Rule. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rggi (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). 
 15.  REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005) 
[hereinafter RGGI MOU], available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. 
 16.  REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 BUDGET TRADING 
PROGRAM (2007) [hereinafter RGGI OVERVIEW], available at http://rggi.org/docs/ 
program_summary_10_07.pdf. 
 17.  The RGGI cap is currently projected out to 2018. From 2009 to 2014, the cap is 188 
million tons of CO2 emissions per year, which will decline by 2.5 percent a year beginning in 
2015. This plan will realize a total reduction of 10 percent by 2018. Id. at 2. 
 18.  RGGI allowances are auctioned quarterly and may also be obtained through 
secondary markets, the Chicago Climate Futures Exchange (CCFE), or Green Exchange. 
RGGI uses the majority of the proceeds of these auctions to invest in consumer benefit 
programs such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, direct energy bill assistance, and other 
programs to reduce greenhouse gases. Id. at 4–6. 
 19.  A Partner to the WCI is a state or province which commits to participate fully in the 
program’s cap-and-trade and reduction commitments. The seven states which are active 
partners in the WCI are Arizona, California, New Mexico, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and 
Washington. The four Canadian provinces are British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and 
Quebec. WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DETAILED DESIGN § 1.1 (2010) [hereinafter WCI 
DETAILED DESIGN], available at 
http://westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/program-design/Detailed-
Design/. 
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this program, which extends into both Canada and Mexico, is not 
matched by any other regional initiative.20 While the WCI’s cap-and-
trade mechanism is not yet operational, it is scheduled to become 
active in 2012;21 its allowance auction will occur in a nearly identical 
manner to RGGI.22 The scope of its emissions cap is comparatively 
massive—it covers nearly ninety percent of economy-wide emissions 
of the states within the WCI’s jurisdiction.23 The Initiative will grow 
substantially in 2015, when the WCI’s jurisdiction will expand to 
cover “any fuel supplier”24 that distributes “any fossil fuel sold or 
imported for consumption” that emits 25,000 tons or more of CO2 
equivalent when combusted.25 The WCI is designed to achieve a 
fifteen percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions beneath the 
2005 baseline year by 2020.26 
The Midwestern Accord is still in its introductory planning 
stages, given that its Advisory Group just announced their 
recommendations27 and model rule28 in May 2010. Six of the 
 
 20.  In addition to the states and provinces which are partners to the WCI, there are also 
numerous members which have not made a full commitment and are thus considered observers. 
The observer states from the United States are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, and 
Wyoming. The observer provinces from Canada are Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and Yukon. 
The observer states from Mexico are Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, 
Sonora, and Tamaulipas. THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI 
REGIONAL PROGRAM: DESIGN SUMMARY 3 (2010) [hereinafter WCI DESIGN SUMMARY], 
available at http://westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/281/. 
 21.  The cap-and-trade program will begin in 2012 regulating generators and industrial 
sources, then expand in 2015 to include providers of transportation fuels and residential and 
commercial fuels. Id. at 8–10. 
 22.  WCI DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 6; WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra note 20, 
at 18–19. 
 23.  Compare WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 5 (embracing a broad scope that is 
“economy-wide” in order to achieve the “most cost-effective reduction opportunities”), with 
RGGI OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 2 (mandating that RGGI will regulate only “fossil fuel-
fired electric generating units serving a generator of 25 MW or larger” and that any source 
which commenced operation prior to 2005 must use fossil fuels for more than 50% of its heat 
output to qualify). 
 24.  WCI DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 3.2.3 (including under the umbrella of fuel 
suppliers any distributors of liquid transportation fuels, petroleum coke, natural gas, propane, 
heating fuel, or “any other fossil fuel sold or imported for consumption”). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. § 5.2.4.2. 
 27.  MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE ADVISORY GROUP (2010) [hereinafter ACCORD RECOMMENDATIONS], available at 
http://www.seventhgenerationadvisors.org/images/stories/pdfs/accord_final_recommendations.p
df. 
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Initiative’s seven member states are of the United States: Iowa, 
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin; the other, 
Manitoba, is a Canadian province.29 Not included in its count of seven 
member states are its four observer states; that is to say, states 
without full voting participation.30 The Midwest Accord’s cap-and-
trade program sets 2005 as its baseline year and sets the cap at twenty 
percent below this level by December 31, 2020 and eighty percent 
below this level by December 31, 2050.31 Assuming that the Initiative 
follows the Advisory Group’s recommendations, its program will 
include all sources which emit over 25,000 metric tons of CO2 
equivalent within the following sectors: electricity generation, 
industrial combustion sources, industrial process sources, fuels 
serving residential, commercial, industrial buildings, or transportation 
fuels; there is exception for biomass, biofuels and biogenic 
emissions.32 
Although the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States is too large for any state to handle on its own, collective 
action amongst the regional initiatives has the potential to yield 
meaningful reductions and set the stage for future national-level 
cooperation. While some of the regional initiatives make no secret of 
their preference for national action,33 the Midwest Accord,34 WCI,35 
 
 28.  MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD, FINAL MODEL RULE FOR 
THE MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD (2010) [hereinafter ACCORD 
MODEL RULE], available at http://www.igreenlaw.com/storage/Final_Model_Rule1.pdf. 
 29.  A state is a participating jurisdiction to the Midwestern Accord if it signed the 
Midwestern Accord’s Memorandum of Understanding. Id. § XX-1.2(bh). On November 15, 
2007, the governors of Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Manitoba, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding and entered the Midwestern Accord. ACCORD 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 27, at 2. 
 30.  The Midwestern Accord’s Observer States are Indiana, Ohio, Ontario, and South 
Dakota. Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/mggra (last visited Aug. 
31, 2011) (listing the partner jurisdictions and observer states (which are not included in either 
the Model Rule or Advisory Recommendations documents)). 
 31.  ACCORD MODEL RULE, supra note 28, § XX-1.1. Additionally, the cap-and-trade 
program is to begin on “January 1 of the first calendar year that is at least 12 months after the 
adoption of the model rule and execution of an implementing memorandum of understanding 
by the participating jurisdictions.” Id. 
 32.  Id. § XX-1.4. 
 33.  See, e.g., ACCORD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 27, at 3 (stating that all member 
states and Canadian provinces “strongly prefer the implementation of an effective cap-and-
trade program at the federal level in both countries, rather than a regional program”). 
 34.  The Accord makes quite clear its intention to pursue linkage in its design principles 
which state that it must “[e]nable linkage to systems in other jurisdictions with similarly rigorous 
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and RGGI36 all recognize that collective action is possible, although 
not guaranteed, and may serve as a vehicle for more widespread 
greenhouse gas emissions abatement. 
III. THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY LIMITED JURISDICTION 
While the desire and ability to link the initiatives is critical to a 
successful future effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States, the regional initiatives also will be required to navigate 
numerous obstacles. The most immediate and glaring problem is, 
quite simply, their limited jurisdiction: An individual initiative’s 
ability to put a dent in nationwide greenhouse gas emissions is 
limited,37 and, even if they were to combine the entirety of their 
membership, the initiatives could not compel non-participating states 
to abide by emission abatement goals. As is true in the global context, 
and as applies here by analogy, any abatement action, both with 
regard to its enforceability and its effectiveness, will require the 
broadest possible cooperation.38 
The extent of the initiatives’ jurisdiction is one of the most 
determinative elements of their ability to mitigate the deleterious 
effect of the two most critical threats: free riders39 and leakage.40 
Employing asymmetrical regulation to reduce greenhouse gases will 
inevitably lead some states to take little or no action of their own. 
These non-participating states will recognize that there is little 
 
accounting in order to create economies of scale and to increase market efficiencies, diversity, 
and liquidity, while reducing costs.” Id. at 4. 
 35.  Of all three initiatives, WCI is by far the most adamant on the subject of linkage. It 
includes both a detailed provision to allow for linkage in its Detailed Design, see WCI 
DETAILED DESIGN, supra note 19, § 9, and reiterates its “commitment to promote[] broad 
collaborative action to reduce GHG emissions” in its design summary. WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, 
supra note 20, at 22. 
 36.  RGGI’s Model Rule includes an elaborate provision to incorporate an offset 
mechanism into the program. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE 83–135 
(2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf [hereinafter 
RGGI MODEL RULE]. Additionally, RGGI has reportedly even held informal talks with the EU 
ETS on the potential for linkage. See Saeed Shah, U.S. States Defy Bush Over Greenhouse 
Gases, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 12, 2004, at 30. 
 37.  Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1965–66. 
 38.  Id. Professor Wiener makes this argument in the context of international climate 
change law, but states that it is even more powerful, “a fortiori,” made in the case of the United 
States. It is entirely relevant by analogy here, as the individual states of the United States are 
equally powerless to combat climate change when viewed in light of the aggregate emissions of 
the United States as a whole—not to mention the world. 
 39.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 40.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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economic incentive for them to act when other states, of their own 
volition, will take action and incur the related expenses—thus the free 
rider. Additionally, as regulatory standards for greenhouse gas 
reductions develop and become more stringent, it may become 
economically viable for sources and industry to relocate their sources 
of energy from those states that participate in the initiatives to those 
that do not—leakage.41 Both problems threaten to undermine the 
efficacy of a program that is not of a national scope, underscoring the 
necessity for collaboration. 
A. The Benefits of Collaboration 
All three initiatives have the regulatory power to mandate 
greenhouse gas emissions abatement within their jurisdictions, but 
their long-term viability could be greatly enhanced if they coordinate 
their efforts.42 There is little question that encompassing a greater 
diversity of sources will foster a more robust market for allowances.43 
Including more sources in the market will increase flexibility and 
minimize costs by enabling firms to find the lowest cost methods and 
locations of abatement.44 Additionally, as the defeat of ACES 
revealed, the initiatives will face adamant opposition from industry 
and hostile political forces; therefore collaboration is critical, as 
political capital pooled by a larger community of states would have 
greater potential to overcome such opposition.45 Aside from 
increasing the likelihood of initiative survival, a larger collaboration 
 
 41.  The form of economic leakage discussed here also has evident corollary implications 
for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. While a state or initiative’s emissions may 
decrease as sources reallocate their production or relocate their facilities, net emissions will not 
actually be curbed—the same amount of carbon is still being released into the atmosphere. 
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 54, 75–78 (2005). 
 42.  See W. COAST GOVERNOR’S GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE, STAFF 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNORS (2004), available at http://www.ef.org/ 
westcoastclimate/WCGGWI_Nov_04%20Report.pdf (finding that it would be more efficient 
and effective to act on a regional level and to learn from RGGI’s experience creating a regional 
collaboration); see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Governor George Pataki, Governor 
Calls on Northeast States to Fight Climate Change (Apr. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/03/april25_2_03.htm. 
 43.  See Wiener, supra note 2, at 519 (“[A] broader and thicker market enhances the cost-
effectiveness of trading by engaging lower-cost abatement opportunities. Extending the cap and 
trade market to include all sectors of the economy [and additional states] will further ensure 
cost-effectiveness.”). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  For a brief overview of the political battle that doomed ACES, see supra notes 14–22 
and accompanying text. 
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of states might also facilitate the transfer of technology and ideas, 
while enhancing the competitiveness and cost-efficiency of abating 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.46 
There are strong signals that coordination between the regional 
initiatives will continue to grow. First, both WCI and the Midwest 
Accord appear to have integrated a number of the lessons learned 
from RGGI, the first initiative of this type, into their own regulatory 
frameworks. This influence is well documented in the WCI and the 
Midwest Accord’s regulatory designs and is made explicitly clear in 
some of their founding documents.47 Most importantly, the shared 
characteristics of the initiatives’ cap-and-trade programs could greatly 
ease a future integration, especially because their procedural and 
functional similarities will facilitate the registration, tracking, and 
trade of allowances across the initiatives. Second, in May 2010 the 
three initiatives joined their resources to create the Three-Regions 
Offsets Working Group, which released a white paper on how best to 
design and implement an interregional program to ensure the quality 
of offsets. 48 This action is significant because it signals that the 
initiatives share a “common vision” and may work towards a 
mechanism that will allow parties in any initiative to develop 
interchangeable offset projects in another initiative’s jurisdiction.49 
 
 46.  After all, the initiatives would unite not only twenty-three American states, but also 
several Canadian provinces and, potentially, even a few Mexican states. Two of the United 
States’ and the world’s largest economies are leading members of the initiatives, California and 
New York City. California is the eighth largest economy in the world, with a gross domestic 
product (GDP) of $1.83 trillion, which constitutes 13% of the entire GDP of the United States. 
See Gross Domestic Product By State, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/ (choose “California” for the “state” tab, then 
choose appropriate tabs to find data) (last visited Dec. 12, 2010). New York has a GDP of $1.1 
trillion, and, if it were a nation, it would rank as the 16th largest GDP in the world. See id. 
(choose “New York” for the “state” tab, then choose appropriate tabs to find data). Combined, 
California and New York have an annual GDP of $2.93 trillion. 
 47.  In its design summary, WCI specifically analyzes RGGI’s use of auctions to distribute 
its allowances and adopts a similar quarterly auction system. WCI DESIGN SUMMARY, supra 
note 20, at 18. 
 48.  THREE-REGIONS OFFSETS WORKING GROUP, ENSURING OFFSET QUALITY: DESIGN 
AND IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA FOR A HIGH-QUALITY OFFSET PROGRAM (2010), 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/3_Regions_Offsets_Announcement_05_17_10.pdf. 
 49.  Id. An offset project is a mechanism incorporated into all three initiatives’ programs 
which reduce compliance costs and increase compliance flexibility for sources by allowing them 
to literally offset their own emissions requirements by sponsoring projects to reduce or 
sequester emissions in another sector outside those regulated by the cap-and-trade program to 
which they belong. Given the inherently extra-jurisdictional nature of the mechanism, a 
legitimate, accurate, and comprehensive reporting system must be implemented by all three 
initiatives to ensure its functioning. Due to the necessary stringency of this inter-regional 
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B. The Shortcomings of Limited Collaboration 
Collaboration not only provides benefits for the regional 
initiatives; it is necessary to ensure their long-term viability. 
Unfortunately, there are daunting challenges that threaten 
subnational action due to limitations on the reach of their jurisdiction 
and concerns about federalism. 
1. Leakage. The United States’ market is a highly integrated, 
open network for trade in and among the states. While the exchange 
of domestic goods with as little restriction as possible is positive in 
many circumstances, this lack of constraint makes any regional 
initiative’s effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions exponentially 
more difficult. With fewer barriers to the flow of goods, energy, and 
services, it is easier for energy producers and industry users to 
reallocate their production and distribution, or to relocate their 
facilities.50 
This open market creates particular difficulties for the regional 
initiatives because the ease of leakage also encourages free-riding. 
Power plants and other sources regulated under the regional 
initiatives that are located outside of the initiatives’ jurisdictions incur 
no expense from the initiatives and may distribute their products to 
states within the jurisdiction of the initiatives at no additional 
expense. To restrict them would violate the free flow of interstate 
commerce.51 As a result, states that do not join the regional initiatives 
stand to benefit from increased demand for their products without 
submitting themselves to more stringent emissions standards. Thus, 
states are indirectly encouraged to free-ride for two reasons: first, 
their domestic industries will remain independent of any regulatory 
standard promulgated by the regional initiative, and second, domestic 
industries may also enjoy increased demand for their products as a 
result of the additional constraints imposed on initiative member 
states. 
 
reporting component, it is unavoidable that the growth of an offset program should thereby 
foster collaboration and interdependence amongst the initiatives. 
 50.  It is unlikely that the initiatives or their member states could enact similar barriers, as 
such state action would almost certainly come into conflict with the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, which prohibits a state from discriminating against commerce from another state. See 
Engel, supra note 41; Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1969–70. 
 51.  City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (concluding that any state action 
that the Court finds improperly discriminates against or burdens interstate commerce is 
unconstitutional). 
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This problem is further complicated due to the use of massive 
shared interstate electrical grids in the United States. These grids 
make it possible for energy production to shift “immediately and 
seamlessly,” albeit not over long distances;52 thus, if the price of 
energy production in one state or region increases, it is practically 
effortless for a neighboring state outside of the initiative’s jurisdiction 
to increase its own production in response. The deleterious 
ramifications of such a relationship for greenhouse gas abatement are 
not mere speculation—this form of leakage is believed to be the 
driver behind RGGI’s enormous leakage rates53—and should be an 
enormous motivator for inter-initiative cooperation. 
2. The Free-Rider. So long as participation in the initiatives is 
voluntary, and there is no reason to believe that it will ever be 
anything other than voluntary,54 states that do not participate will 
benefit from the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions achieved by 
those states that do participate.55 In other words, the states that act to 
reduce their emissions cannot realize the full return on their 
investment because they cannot entirely internalize the benefits of 
their effort.56 The burden of the states that free ride will fall on those 
states that take action to reduce their emissions.57 At its core, this is a 
collective action problem: there is little, if any, incentive for a state 
which does not fall under the jurisdiction of the initiatives or which 
will not benefit from those advantages conferred by the initiatives58 to 
acquiesce to more stringent emissions standards. This problem is 
particularly poignant in light of the competitive advantage previously 
considered in the discussion of leakage. 
3. Industrial Flight. As inevitable as the phenomenon of the free 
rider is, so too is that of industrial flight: As the price of doing 
 
 52.  Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1969. 
 53.  The Magnificent Seven: States Take the Lead on Global Warming, AM. COUNCIL FOR 
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (Jan. 16, 2006, 8:00 PM), http://www.aceee.org/ 
blog/2006/01/magnificent-seven-states-take-lead-global-warming (estimating that RGGI’s rate 
of leakage falls between 60% and 90%). 
 54.  See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion on the constitutional limitations of the regional 
initiatives. 
 55.  See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National 
Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 318 (1997) (arguing, by 
analogy for the action of a subnational polity, that free-riding is an inescapable phenomenon so 
long as a state acts unilaterally or membership in a collective initiative is voluntary). 
 56.  J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516–21 (2007). 
 57.  Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1965. 
 58.  See infra II.B.1. 
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business in a state which is party to the initiatives increases—or at 
minimum oscillates due to the effect of new emissions standards—
some sources will reallocate their resources or relocate their 
operations to non-member states.59 This multifaceted problem may be 
understood as the embodiment of two interrelated phenomena: the 
price effect and relocation effect.60 
The price effect is the initial and direct response to the change in 
cost that will inevitably occur when a state adopts new, more stringent 
emissions standards.61 As the cost to produce emissions-intensive 
goods rises within a given initiative’s jurisdiction, producers within 
this jurisdiction will raise the price of the good and reduce the 
quantity that they produce. In reaction to this change, producers of 
the same good located in a non-member state will benefit because 
their costs to produce the good will not rise and as a result, they will 
be able to increase their production and profit.62 
The relocation of a source’s facilities should only take place if an 
initiative’s restrictions on emissions become so stringent that it would 
be more cost effective for a business to move its entire operation to 
another location outside the initiative’s jurisdiction.63 The extent of 
this phenomenon will depend upon the cost-benefit analysis 
undertaken by firms that fall under the jurisdiction of an initiative, 
and will consider the costs of moving their operation against the 
expense of complying with the more stringent local regulation. 
 
 59.  Stavins, supra note 55. It bears mentioning that these dangers are purely economic 
arguments; many other factors may also come into play that might influence a firm’s decision to 
move its operations. 
 60.  Cf. Think Globally, supra note 13, at 1967–68 (arguing, in a global context, that there is 
an additional factor: the “slack off” effect which theorizes that one country may decrease its 
abatement if it is abating up to the point at which its global marginal benefits equal its domestic 
marginal costs and another country then abates beyond its own such equilibrium point, but this 
is not incorporated into the argument of the paper, as such a relationship seems inapplicable for 
an analysis of the behavior of sources in the United States). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. The price effect will occur soon after the implementation of new greenhouse gas 
emission standards by an initiative, and it will not lead to immediate industry relocation. Id. 
However, in the longer term, the price effect will also likely influence the type of businesses that 
operate in a given initiative, as it may foster the growth of one industry while increasing the 
operating costs of another. Id. 
 63.  Id. 
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF REGIONAL, INTERSTATE 
COLLABORATION TO ABATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
With little hope of comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation on 
the horizon, the concerns previously discussed have proven 
insufficient to deter the states from taking action of their own. As 
states continue to take action and interstate cooperation continues to 
spread, the long-term viability of these efforts will increasingly 
depend not only upon their economic success, but their ability to 
survive constitutional challenges within the nation’s courts. 
The constitutionality of subnational environmental regional 
initiatives has been considered in previous scholarship, but many of 
these analyses rest on the flawed assumption that comprehensive 
federal legislation will be forthcoming—this paper departs from that 
tradition to present a pragmatic evaluation of the initiatives’ 
constitutionality as they exist today. Congress has declined to pass 
comprehensive legislation that will regulate nationwide greenhouse 
gas emissions abatement; it is unlikely that it will do so in the 
foreseeable future. This neglected dynamic should play a pivotal role 
in any analysis of the regional initiatives’ ability to survive 
constitutional attacks under preemption doctrine, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and the Compacts Clause. 
A. In the Absence of Federal Legislation 
1. The Compact Clause. The first constitutional question likely to 
arise is whether collaboration between states is even constitutionally 
permitted. Indeed, a purely textualist reading of Article I, Section 
10—commonly known as the Compact Clause—would lead one to 
believe that regional initiatives are not allowed by the Constitution.64 
The language of the Compact Clause appears damning for the 
regional initiatives, as it clearly proclaims that “[n]o State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”65 At first-
glance, this seems to preclude even the existing initiatives because the 
permission of Congress has been neither granted nor requested. This 
immediately glaring conflict, however, should not be a problem, as 
this language was substantially mitigated by the Supreme Court’s 
1893 decision in Virginia v. Tennessee.66 In that decision, the Supreme 
 
 64.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 65.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 66.  Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
Drapalski_122211 (Do Not Delete) 12/22/2011  12:56 PM 
484 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 21:469 
Court found that an agreement between two states in litigation over a 
boundary dispute was constitutional under the Compact Clause 
despite the absence of an explicit grant of congressional consent.67 
Instead, the decision held that “[t]he constitution does not state when 
the consent of congress shall be given, whether it shall precede or 
may follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express or may 
be implied,”68 and, therefore, that the approval of Congress could be 
“fairly implied from its subsequent legislation and proceedings.”69 
Here, it is very likely that Congressional approval is fairly 
implied. First, it would not have been necessary for Congress to grant 
its consent at the inception of the regional initiatives, as this could 
“precede” or “follow the compact made.”70 Second, the question of 
whether Congress has in fact explicitly granted its consent is far from 
dispositive, as it might be “express” or “implied.” Given that 
Congress has thus far chosen not to take action to prevent, displace, 
or limit the development of the regional initiatives, it seems there is a 
fair body of evidence to argue that Congress has impliedly granted its 
consent. 
There is an important qualification to the Court’s application of 
the Compact Clause, however, which is that “the prohibition [on 
compacts between states] is directed to the formation of any 
combination tending to the increase of political power in the states, 
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 
United States.”71 Thus, with language reminiscent of the preemption 
doctrine72 under the Supremacy Clause,73 the Court does have the 
authority to strike down interstate agreements that have not received 
a grant from Congress and threaten to “encroach upon” its “just 
supremacy.”74 However, the Supreme Court limited the scope of such 
a challenge under the Compact Clause in its 1978 decision of U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission.75 In U.S. Steel Corp., the 
Court found that the Constitution permitted a multistate tax policy 
 
 67.  Id. at 519. 
 68.  Id. at 522. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 519. 
 72.  See infra Part B, for a discussion on the preemption doctrine and its pertinence to the 
regional initiatives. 
 73.  U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause, see infra n. 96 
and accompanying text. 
 74.  Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519. 
 75.  U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
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agreement that was formed without an express grant of Congressional 
consent.76 The Court distinguished between an interstate agreement 
that would set the tax policy of the member states and one that 
merely establishes a model rule and expects member states to 
replicate it through their own legislatures.77 Therefore, even if a group 
of states come together and set a model regulatory agenda, so long as 
each state implements its own policy independently, the Compact 
Clause will not render it unconstitutional. 
This nuance bodes well for the survival of the regional initiatives 
in the face of a Compact Clause challenge today. However, the threat 
of such a challenge remains strong enough that the regional initiatives 
operate as voluntary associations of states with no power to mandate 
rules to their members. This is likely why RGGI does not impose 
uniform policies on its members; instead, RGGI adopts model rules—
essentially framework regulatory policies—which the member states 
are theoretically free to interpret and adopt through their own state 
legislative system. While it may seem that a prisoner’s dilemma of 
sorts might arise out of this situation—meaning here that states might 
act to expand the initiatives to bind other states to stringent 
regulations while failing to comply themselves—such a problem has 
not occurred with the RGGI member states. It is too early to state 
definitively, however, that the limitations imposed by the Compact 
Clause will not become a larger problem in the future. As the 
regional initiatives’ membership grows to include more states, each 
with its own disparate interests, the need for more stringent, 
compulsory regulation may become increasingly necessary. As the 
initiatives stand today, however, and so long as the states remain 
cognizant of their constitutionally mandated design limitations, it 
seems unlikely that a constitutional challenge under the Compact 
Clause could succeed against the initiatives in their current form. 
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause. The difficulty created by the 
absence of trade barriers and free exchange of goods in the United 
States is further complicated by the limitations placed upon the states 
to take action to correct for the price irregularity created by their 
membership in a regional initiative. If, for example, RGGI’s member 
 
 76.  Id. at 479. 
 77.  Id. at 497 (“Even if appellants’ factual allegations were supported by the record, they 
would be irrelevant to the facial validity of the Compact. As we have noted above, it is only the 
individual State, not the Commission, that has the power to issue an assessment—whether 
arbitrary or not. If the assessment violates state law, we must assume that state remedies are 
available.”) 
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states, or even RGGI itself, had the ability to place a tax on energy 
imports into their jurisdiction or, conversely, give an advantage to the 
utilities that produce energy within their jurisdiction, then they could 
compensate for the disparity in price created by their more stringent 
emissions standards. Unfortunately, the states are not entirely free to 
take such action due to the jurisprudence surrounding the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. As the following discussion will show, however, it 
is premature to conclude that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
precludes interstate climate change action. 
a. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence.  
The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial doctrine derived by 
the Supreme Court from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian tribes.”78 This enumerated power of Congress, 
commonly called the Commerce Clause, has been interpreted by the 
judicial branch to create a negative power—the Dormant Commerce 
Clause79—which authorizes the federal courts to strike down as 
unconstitutional any state regulation that improperly burdens or 
discriminates against interstate commerce. Generally speaking, 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be grouped into two 
broad categories: state statutes that facially discriminate against 
interstate commerce—and are therefore nearly always per se 
unconstitutional—and state statutes that are not found 
discriminatory, but that are subject to a balancing test originating 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.80 that 
weighs the state’s purpose and local benefits against the burden 
placed on interstate commerce. 
A state statute is facially discriminatory if it disadvantages out-
of-state interests, or favors in-state interests over out-of-state 
interests.81 For this reason, state regulations passed merely for the 
sake of economic protectionism are virtually always per se invalid.82 
 
 78.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 79.  For the origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 
(1824). An analysis of the sordid history of the Dormant Commerce Clause is unnecessary for 
the purposes of this paper, as the holding case law at present will determine the outcome of a 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge against local climate change legislation. 
 80.  397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 81.  Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 82.  City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
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This would be the case, for example, if a state were to pass a law that 
prohibits the import of energy from another state without any 
semblance of justification. This is not always the case, however; the 
Supreme Court ruled in Maine v. Taylor83 that state legislation can be 
exempt in certain exceptional circumstances if it is passed to 
accomplish a “legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as 
well by available nondiscriminatory means.”84 If the court finds that 
the law in question is nondiscriminatory on its face, but might still 
have impact—or, in other words, an “incidental effect”85—on 
interstate commerce, then it applies the Pike balancing test that 
weighs the in-state benefits it produces against its burden on 
interstate commerce.86 The weight placed upon the in-state benefits 
produced by a state statute—and, in particular, on the type of in-state 
benefits produced—has enormous implications for the likelihood of 
survival of a state statute passed to comply with an interstate 
environmental initiative. 
b. Implications for Regional Climate Initiatives.  
The threat of a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge does limit 
the ability of states to pass legislation that might most expediently 
ensure the success of the regional initiatives, but it does not entirely 
preclude such action. For example, a statute passed by RGGI 
member states that prohibits energy imports from non-RGGI states 
would likely be found discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause—assuming here, for the sake 
of argument that it would not fit into the atypical Maine exception 
mold.87 The states are clearly precluded from passing any blanket 
legislation that facially discriminates against out-of-state commerce, 
but, so long as state legislators draft the language of their bills 
carefully, states should be able to avoid passing statutes that are 
clearly discriminatory and per se unconstitutional under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. While this complicates matters somewhat, it does 
not render local climate legislation moot. It does mean that the RGGI 
member states cannot pass individual laws that prohibit energy 
 
 83.  477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 84.  Id. at 138. 
 85.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Maine, 477 U.S. at 151–52 (finding that Maine’s ban on the importation of baitfish is 
clearly discriminatory but justified by the legitimate local purpose of the state to “protect the 
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources”). 
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imports from non-RGGI states. This would certainly be the easiest 
route to account for the ease with which firms in RGGI states 
circumvent RGGI’s regulations, but it is by no means the only 
approach. 
Instead, states should pass legislation that is optimally designed 
to survive a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge under the Pike 
balancing test and its progeny. The Pike test holds that a state 
regulation passed “evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate purpose”88 
will only be struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause if the 
burden it imposes on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”89 Pike places great importance 
upon the type of benefit produced by the state regulation: “the nature 
of the local interest involved” will determine the “extent of the 
burden [on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated.”90 
The distinction between the types of benefits produced by 
regulations that place a burden on interstate commerce is critical due 
to the added legitimacy and authority of state exercises of the police 
power. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
that benefits to the environment are an important public benefit 
bestowed by the states upon their citizens.91 First, the Supreme Court 
recognized the value of environmental benefits in its decision in 
Maine when it held that a state “retains broad regulatory authority to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its 
natural resources”92 so long as it does not “needlessly obstruct 
interstate trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic 
isolation.’”93 Then, in its 2007 decision in United Haulers Ass’n v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management,94 the Supreme Court held 
that a city ordinance requiring local waste haulers to bring their waste 
to a facility owned by the city was permissible in part because it 
“confer[red] significant health and environmental benefits upon the 
citizens of the Counties. . . .[and] [f]or these reasons, any arguable 
 
 88.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 92.  Maine, 477 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  550 U.S. at 330. 
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burden the ordinances impose on interstate commerce does not 
exceed their public benefits.”95 
Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, benefits to the 
state and its citizens’ health, welfare, and environment outweigh 
those that are purely pecuniary.96 The states have a substantial 
interest in preserving the health and welfare of their citizenry; this 
might especially be true in the case of environmental harms found to 
be a “threat to the public health and welfare.”97 In other words, while 
a benefit such as “revenue generation is not a local interest that can 
justify discrimination against interstate commerce,”98 environmental 
benefits should be grouped into the category of a “reasonable basis 
for legislation to protect the social . . . welfare of a community” for 
which it is not the decision of the court to “deny the exercise locally 
of [a state’s] sovereign power.”99 
Here, state statutes passed as part of an interstate environmental 
collaboration are therefore predisposed to survive a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge given that there is a clear local interest at 
stake, with tangible benefits produced, for a purpose that the Court 
has previously recognized. The states have a substantial interest in 
preserving the health and welfare of their citizenry, and this remains 
true for greenhouse gas emissions—a phenomenon that EPA has 
previously found to be a “threat to the public health and welfare.”100 
In sum, not only do the states have a recognized interest under the 
Pike test in taking action to mitigate a recognized threat to their local 
population when the federal government has declined to do so, but 
 
 95.  United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added). 
 96.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1994) 
(distinguishing between “revenue generation [which] is not a local interest that can justify 
discrimination against interstate commerce” and legitimate local interests such as 
“environmental cleanup costs,” which would be valid but “must be rejected absent the clearest 
showing that the unobstructed flow of interstate commerce itself is unable to solve the local 
problem”). 
 97.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under § 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). This endangerment finding 
was made in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007), and it follows that such findings might be considered of some value to the courts in 
appraising the value of local benefits produced. 
 98.  C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. 
 99.  Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951). 
 100.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under § 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
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the type of benefits that their action will produce belong to a class 
that is most favored by the Pike test.101 
B. Preemption 
The absence of federal legislation—and the improbability of any 
such legislation arriving in the foreseeable future—dramatically alters 
this analysis. Instead, the focus should shift to the likelihood of 
preemption by an administrative agency; namely, preemption arising 
out of a potential conflict between state statutes and EPA’s 
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 
1. Federal Preemption. Preemption jurisprudence, which arises 
out of the Supremacy Clause102 of Article IV of the Constitution, 
concerns the outcome in instances where there is a potential overlap 
between state and federal legislation. While, according to the plain 
text of the Supremacy Clause, it is clear that state law is trumped 
when it expressly conflicts with federal law, the facts are rarely so 
straightforward. Congress can indicate preemptive intent either 
through express language included in its legislation103—so-called 
“express preemption”—or through its “implied intent”104—commonly 
referred to as “field preemption.” This implied intent can be inferred 
through the structure and purpose of Congress’s legislation,105 or, 
more precisely, “if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress 
intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an 
actual conflict between state and federal law.”106 
In such an analysis of “field preemption,” Congress’s purpose is 
the “ultimate touchstone”107 of the decision; however, this is tempered 
by the additional deference afforded to the states that “the historic 
 
 101.  It also bears consideration that since the United Haulers decision in 2007, the 
disposition of the court has not radically changed. Two of the Justices who joined that majority 
opinion—Justices Stevens and Souter—have been replaced by two similarly-leaning Justices: 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. 
 102.  The text of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution is as follows: 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding.” 
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 103.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). 
 107.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
Drapalski_122211 (Do Not Delete) 12/22/2011  12:56 PM 
Spring 2011] THE VIABILITY OF INTERSTATE COLLABORATION 491 
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”108 
This presumption in favor of state legislation is further bolstered 
when Congress legislates in a field previously dominated by the 
states.109 Additionally, in the event that expressly preemptive 
language in a federal statute is ambiguous, it is customary to interpret 
in a manner that “disfavors preemption,” and, therefore, favors state 
legislation.110 
2. Preemption by an Administrative Agency & the Clean Air Act. 
Rules promulgated by EPA—not Congress—now present the most 
likely source of possible preemption challenges to state legislation. 
This is a new federalism question that will play an increasingly 
important role for the future of subnational interstate initiatives that 
will operate in an absence of clearly preemptive federal legislation. 
Interestingly, although the jurisprudence is not as developed for 
agency preemption as it is for federal preemption, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court now recognizes an ever-growing deference to 
administrative agency action.111 
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided in Geir v. American 
Honda Motor Co.112 that a state law regarding airbags was preempted 
by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) implementation of 
new airbag requirements.113 In making this decision, the Supreme 
Court not only granted deference to DOT’s interpretation of the 
statute,114 but also explicitly recognized that “regulations ‘intended to 
pre-empt state law’ that are promulgated by an agency acting 
nonarbitrarily and within its congressionally delegated authority may 
also have pre-emptive force.”115 Further expanding the preemptive 
 
 108.  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 109.  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 110.  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 
 111.  This trend in the jurisprudence culminates with Geir v. American Honda Motor Co., 
529 U.S. 861 (2000), but it is clearly alluded to prior to that decision in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 
496 (“Because the FDA is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to 
implement the provisions of the Act, the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a 
particular form of state law [conflicts with the purpose and objectives of Congress] and, 
therefore, whether it should be pre-empted.”) (citation omitted). 
 112.  Geir, 529 U.S. at 861. 
 113.  Id. at 874. 
 114.  Id. at 883. 
 115.  Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-154 (1982) (“Where 
Congress has directed to an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to 
judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted 
arbitrarily.”). 
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authority of administrative agencies, the Court recognized an implied 
intent to preempt—in other words, field preemption—when it found 
that agencies do not need to rely upon a “specific expression of 
agency intent to pre-empt.”116 The implications of this deference to 
agency preemption are enormous for state climate change regulation, 
but the practical ramifications will depend entirely upon the attitude 
that EPA assumes toward state and regional action. 
3. A New Challenge to Federalism. For the time being, EPA has 
not yet posed a preemption challenge to the nascent regional 
initiatives. This may be due in part to the CAA’s generous savings 
clause that allows states to impose regulatory standards of their own 
so long as they are more stringent than the federal standards.117 Worth 
further consideration is the fact that a savings clause—even one like 
that contained within the CAA—does not entirely preclude such a 
challenge, given that the Supreme Court also ruled in Geir that a 
savings clause alone does not “foreclose” the possibility of implied 
preemption.118 
Should EPA decide to challenge the legality of a state’s statute 
that it adopted in accordance with its membership in a regional 
initiative, the state may find some defense in an argument that 
Congress did not in-fact delegate preemptive authority to EPA based 
upon a reading of the CAA’s declaration of purpose.119 This 
declaration does not appear to mandate absolute authority to EPA, 
but instead grants it the responsibility to “encourage and assist 
development and operation of regional air pollution prevention and 
control programs”120 and “to provide technical and financial assistance 
to State and local governments.”121 Based upon the CAA’s text, EPA 
is encouraged under its congressional grant of authority to assist, not 
hinder, local initiatives or, in this case, regional initiatives and 
collaborative state action. 
This language may become critical for the regional initiatives 
should a pre-emption challenge ever arise. Under such circumstances, 
 
 116.  Id. at 885. 
 117.  42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006) (“[N]othing in this Act shall preclude or deny the right of any 
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation 
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of 
air pollution; . . . [so long as it is not] less stringent than the standard or limitation under such 
plan or section.”). 
 118.  Geir, 529 U.S. at 869. 
 119.  42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 120.  Id. § 7401(b)(4). 
 121.  Id. § 7401(b)(3). 
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the regional initiatives would be well-advised to point to this statutory 
language to prove that Congress intended for EPA to augment state 
or local action, not to preempt it. This will surely be a contested issue, 
but only time will tell how EPA will choose to respond to the 
initiatives and their regulatory policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of a comprehensive, nationwide federal 
regulatory scheme to address climate change action, states have 
stepped in to fill the void through coordinated action of their own. 
These subnational efforts, although well-guided, face substantial 
economic and constitutional difficulties. Much of the scholarship on 
these regional initiatives operates on the assumption that federal 
action is forthcoming. This Note consciously departs from that 
position in its analysis of the viability of interstate climate action. 
As this analysis shows, a pragmatic acceptance of current events 
does not preclude an optimistic outlook for the continued success of 
the regional initiatives. The regional initiatives are viable without 
comprehensive federal legislation. Hopefully, this initial foray will 
contribute to a shift in the academic discourse on subnational climate 
action that will increasingly consider how the initiatives might expand 
and accomplish nationwide greenhouse gas abatement through their 
own means. 
 
 
